A more likely explanation for Admiral Schade’s statements is that he did not want to disclose that the SOSUS readouts indicating that the Scorpion had been destroyed were known earlier than reported.ħ.

Because of this, it was not unusual for a submarine not to respond to incoming traffic. Moreover, it was common during this era for a submarine to receive messages but be unable to respond because of broadcast difficulties. As a witness before the Court of Inquiry, he admitted that the Scorpion was not expected to respond to any messages and that he did not expect to hear from her until 27 May, the day she was supposed to arrive in Norfolk. The Scorpion was under strict orders to maintain radio silence unless absolutely necessary. Admiral Schade’s claim that he became concerned about the Scorpion after her failure to respond to several messages is one of the strangest in this disaster. Ed Offley, “The Death of the Scorpion,” The Virginian-Pilot & Ledger-Star, 12 June 1983.Ħ. Although still classified, the Scorpion's final broadcast is said to have occurred at 31:19 north latitude, 27:37 west longitude. The Soviet ballistic-missile destroyer and oiler did not arrive until the Scorpion already was 200 miles to the west of the formation.ģ. Navy planes resumed surveillance of this formation on 21 May, presumably after the Scorpion had completed her own operation. The Scorpion participated in two operations in the Mediterranean: Dawn Patrol and Easy Gambler.Ģ. Navy Court of Inquiry Record of Proceedings and the Supplementary Record of Proceedings Concerning the Loss of the USS SCORPION (SSN-589), (hereafter called Inquiry Record and Supplementary Record), p. Manual of the Judge Advocate General (JAGMAN) / U.S.

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